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                       OPINION OF THE COURT 
                      _____________________ 
 
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge.          
         Under the particular facts presented here we must 
decide whether the teachings of Ryan Operations G.P. v. Santium- 
Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355 (3d Cir. 1996), may be applied in 
this case to invoke the doctrine of judicial estoppel.  
Specifically, we must decide whether Appellant is judicially 
estopped from contending that he is a "`qualified person with a 
disability' . . . who, with or without reasonable accommodation, 
can perform the essential functions" of a job as contemplated by 
the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.  12111(8), 
12112(a), in light of his representations to federal and state 
government agencies that he is totally disabled and unable to 
work. 
         This issue is presented in Leonard McNemar's appeal 
from the district court's order granting The Disney Store's 
motion for summary judgment on McNemar's discrimination claims 
under the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), the New Jersey 
Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD), and  510 of the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).  McNemar appeals also 
from the district court's order granting Disney summary judgment 
on his New Jersey state law claims for invasion of privacy and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress.   
         In granting summary judgment, the district court held 
that McNemar was judicially estopped from asserting his claims 
under the ADA, NJLAD, and ERISA because of his prior sworn 
statements, made in his application for Social Security 
Disability Insurance benefits and New Jersey state disability 
benefits, that he was unable to work because of a disabling 
physical condition.  The district court further held that McNemar 
had failed to satisfy prima facie requirements of his state law 
claims of invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress.      
         The district court had jurisdiction over Appellant's 
ADA and ERISA claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C.  1331.  The district 
court had supplemental jurisdiction over Appellant's state law 
claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C.  1367.  This court has jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C.  1291.  The appeal was timely filed under 
Rule 4(a), Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
         This court reviews the district court's application of 
judicial estoppel for abuse of discretion.  Yanez v. United 
States, 989 F.2d 323 (9th Cir. 1993); Levin v. Robinson, Wayne & 
La Sala, 586 A.2d 1348, 1357 (N.J. Super. Law Div. 1990) (citing 
Matter of Cassidy, 892 F.2d 637, 642 (7th Cir. 1990)).  This 
court has plenary review of the district court's order granting 
summary judgment on the state law claims.  Kinney v. Yerusalim, 9 
F.3d 1067, 1070 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1545 
(1994). 
         Because application of the doctrine of judicial 
estoppel always is factually driven, we now will set forth the 
facts in extensive narrative detail. 
 
                                I. 
 
         McNemar was employed by The Disney Store, Inc. as an 
assistant store manager in Cherry Hill, New Jersey.  On October 
12, 1993, McNemar was hospitalized for pneumocystis carinii 
pneumonia and diagnosed as HIV-positive.  Between becoming ill in 
October 1993 and being terminated at Disney on November 18, 1993, 
McNemar would miss 17 1/2 of 25 work days (68% of his normal 
working time).  
         McNemar revealed the results of his diagnosis to 
Lillian Forcey, the store manager, whom he considered to be his 
friend.  He did not tell anyone else at the store, but he did 
tell other friends, including two people he had worked with at a 
Disney store in Delaware before his transfer to Cherry Hill in 
1992.  
         On November 8, 1993, Joelyn Ale, the Disney Store 
District Manager, summoned McNemar to her office, privately 
informed him that she had heard rumors that he had tested 
positive for HIV, and asked if the rumors were true.  Ale 
explained that she was informing McNemar of the rumors so that, 
should he want to, he could address them.  McNemar admits that 
Ale was being supportive, offering to help him in any way 
possible.  However, he told Ale that he was not in fact HIV- 
positive, but that he had pneumonia.  McNemar thanked Ale for 
informing him of the rumors, declined any assistance, and said he 
thought he knew the source and would deal with the problem 
himself.   
          On November 16, 1993, in knowing violation of company 
policy, McNemar took two dollars from the store cash register and 
asked another employee, Estelle Williamson, to use the money to 
purchase cigarettes for him.  Because Disney policy requires that 
all employees store their personal belongings in lockers in the 
back of the store, McNemar had no cash on his person.  Rather 
than go to his locker to retrieve money from his wallet, McNemar 
took the two dollars from the cash register and gave it to 
Williamson to purchase the cigarettes.  McNemar then discarded 
the cash register transaction record, which, according to company 
policy, must be signed and filed whenever money from the cash 
register is used.   
         Williamson purchased the cigarettes and then called 
Disney's Loss Prevention Hotline to report that McNemar had taken 
money from the register, in violation of Disney's anti-shrinkage 
policy.  After Williamson returned with the cigarettes, McNemar 
took a smoke break in the back of the store, but failed to 
retrieve his own money in order to reimburse the cash register.   
         McNemar had sole responsibility for closing the store 
that night, a procedure that included balancing cash deposits 
with receipts. In performing this task, McNemar still did not 
replace the cash in the register or put it with the cash deposits 
for the day; he simply sealed the cash deposit bags without 
replacing any money. Even though the daily balance was discrepant 
by the two dollars he had taken, McNemar made no notation or 
report of what had occurred.  
         Meanwhile, Williamson had reported McNemar's initial 
infraction to another assistant manager, Maria Skyrm Brookover.  
Brookover checked the register, found that it was two dollars 
short, and looked unsuccessfully for a transaction record in the 
accordion file where it should have been placed.  Brookover 
instructed Williamson to call Disney's "Loss Prevention Hotline"; 
Brookover also called the hotline herself.   
         The next morning, November 17, 1996, Evelyn 
McCorristin, the assistant manager who opened the store, followed 
standard store procedures in checking the previous day's cash 
deposits, register amounts, and the safe fund.  McCorristin 
discovered that the cash deposits were off by two dollars, and 
noted the discrepancy.  She then counted the register and safe 
fund amounts, which were as they should have been, not containing 
any extra money.  A short time later, Brookover, who was not 
working that morning, called McCorristin to ask whether there was 
still a dollar shortage; McCorristin told her that there was.  
Brookover then told Ale about what had happened the previous day, 
confirming that the money was still missing.     
         The Disney Store management then began the 
investigation procedure it uniformly follows when an employee is 
reported for the unauthorized taking of company money or property 
for personal use.  On November 18, 1996, McNemar's next day of 
work, he was interviewed by Ale, in person, and by Jeff Hill, a 
Disney Store Loss Prevention Supervisor in Atlanta, by telephone.  
During the interview, McNemar admitted to taking the money for 
his personal use, after which, at Hill's request, McNemar wrote 
and signed a statement recounting his actions in the matter.   
         On the basis of this admission, Ale and Hill then 
immediately suspended McNemar, asked him for his store keys and 
identification, and told him that they would speak to Disney 
headquarters in California about whether he should be discharged.  
At this point McNemar broke down in tears and apologized for 
taking the money, then divulged that he was HIV-positive.     
         Ale reported the substance of the interview to Teri 
Meiers, Employee Relations Supervisor at California Headquarters. 
Upon hearing that McNemar had at the last minute revealed that he 
was HIV-positive, Meiers thought it prudent to check with her 
superiors before approving a discharge.  She consulted with 
Michael Frank, Vice President for Human Resources, who felt the 
situation was clear-cut and required a discharge, and with Curt 
Carlile, then Manager of Training and Employee Relations, who 
concurred.  Both Frank and Carlile felt that McNemar should not 
be penalized less severely than other employees in similar 
situations simply because of his disclosure.   
         Later that same day, Ale telephoned McNemar and asked 
him to come in for another meeting to discuss the decision to 
terminate his employment.  When McNemar refused to come in, Ale 
told him of the decision to discharge him. 
   
                               II. 
         Following his dismissal, McNemar applied for and 
received New Jersey state disability benefits, Social Security 
disability benefits, and exemption from repayment of an 
educational loan from the Pennsylvania Higher Education Agency.  
To obtain these benefits, McNemar and his doctors have certified 
under penalty of perjury that he has been totally and permanently 
disabled and unable to work since October 1, 1993, at least five 
weeks before he was discharged by Disney.    
         For example, in his November 23, 1993, application for 
Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits, McNemar 
made a sworn statement that he "became unable to work because of 
my disabling condition on October 01, 1993."  On the same date, 
McNemar applied for Supplemental Social Security Income (SSI), 
and on that application he stated that he was disabled and was 
informed that making false statements would subject him to civil 
and criminal penalties. 
         On December 2, 1993, McNemar applied for New Jersey 
State disability benefits, certifying that his disability was 
"AIDS" and that he had been afflicted since October 12, 1993.  
On January 11, 1994, McNemar certified to the New Jersey State 
Disability Insurance Service that he had been "unable to perform 
the duties of [his] regular occupation" since October 12, 1993.  
         On his December 2, 1993 application for state 
disability benefits, McNemar submitted a statement, signed by Dr. 
Roseann Lorenick, his physician at the time, that McNemar had 
been disabled and unable to work because of a disability from 
"10/93 to present."  JA 166.  On January 20, 1994, Dr. Lorenick 
certified that McNemar had been under her care for the "period of 
disability" from "10/14/93 through present"  and that "[t]he 
patient has been unable to perform all the duties of his/her 
regular or usual job (i.e., too disabled to work) from 10/16/93."  
JA 169.  And on June 15, 1994, Dr. John Turner, a specialist whom 
McNemar began seeing in February 1994, certified that "[a]s of 
October 13, 1993 Mr. McNemar has been totally and permanently 
disabled."  JA 179. 
         On July 19, 1994, McNemar applied to the Pennsylvania 
Higher Education Agency for a deferment from making payments on 
his loan principal, on the basis that he was "unable to work and 
earn money."  JA 178.  On July 27, 1994, when completing his 
portion of McNemar's loan deferment application, Dr. Turner faced 
a choice of certifying that McNemar had (1) a temporary 
disability or (2) a total and permanent disability.  Dr. Turner 
chose the latter, signing the following statement: 
         I certify that in my best professional judgment 
         [McNemar is] . . . [p]ermanently totally disabled and 
         so is unable to work and earn money because of an 
         impairment that is expected to continue indefinitely or 
         result in death.   
 
JA 178.    
                               III. 
         On November 17, 1994, McNemar filed a complaint against 
Disney which alleged unlawful discrimination in violation of the 
ADA and ERISA and which, relying on supplemental jurisdiction, 
contained several state law claims.  On May 8, 1995, Disney 
moved for summary judgment on all of McNemar's claims.  On June 
16, 1995, McNemar filed his brief in opposition and formally 
withdrew, with prejudice, half of his claims because they 
provided redundant bases of recovery.  On June 30, 1995, the 
district court granted Disney's motion and entered judgment in 
Disney's favor on all of McNemar's remaining claims, holding that 
McNemar was judicially estopped from asserting his claims under 
the ADA, NJLAD and ERISA because of his prior sworn statements to 
various government agencies that he was totally and permanently 
disabled and unable to work.  The district court held also that 
McNemar had failed as a matter of law to satisfy prima facierequirements 
of his state law claims for invasion of privacy and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress.  This appeal 
followed.  
 
 
                               IV. 
         The doctrine of judicial estoppel serves a consistently 
clear and undisputed jurisprudential purpose: to protect the 
integrity of the courts.  The Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit recently described this as the basis on which a court has 
the discretion to exercise judicial estoppel: "[T]he purpose of 
the doctrine is to protect the integrity of the judicial process.  
Accordingly, the doctrine of judicial estoppel `is an equitable 
doctrine invoked by a court at its discretion.'"  Yanez v. U.S., 
989 F.2d 323, 326 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Morris v. California, 
966 F.2d 448, 452-53 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 831, 
(citation omitted) (1992)).   
         This court has accepted the doctrine of judicial 
estoppel at least since Scarano v. Central Railroad Co. of New 
Jersey, 203 F.2d 510, 513 (3d Cir. 1953), and consistently has 
reiterated the judicial system integrity purpose of the doctrine. 
See, e.g., Ryan Operations G.P. v. Santium-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 
F.3d 355, 361 (3d Cir. 1996) ("[j]udicial estoppel is intended to 
prevent parties from playing fast and loose with the courts by 
asserting inconsistent positions"); EF Operating Corp. v. 
American Buildings, 993 F.2d 1046, 1050 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 
114 S. Ct. 193 (1993) ("It goes without saying that one cannot 
casually cast aside representations, oral or written, in the 
course of litigation simply because it is convenient to do so"); 
Fleck v. KDI Sylvan Pools, Inc., 981 F.2d 107, 121 (3d Cir. 
1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1645 (1993) (judicial estoppel 
"preserves the integrity of the judicial system" by preventing 
parties from "assert[ing] a position in this proceeding 
inconsistent with the one they previously asserted"); Delgrosso 
v. Spang & Co., 903 F.2d 234, 241 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 
U.S. 967 (1990) (judicial estoppel "precludes a party from 
assuming a position in a legal proceeding that contradicts or is 
inconsistent with a previously asserted position"); United States 
v. Gleason, 458 F.2d 171, 175 (3d Cir. 1972) (judicial estoppel 
is "applied to secure substantial equity"). 
         McNemar argues that the use of judicial estoppel is 
subject to narrow requirements that preclude its use here:  
         Thus, in this Circuit, a litigant seeking to judicially 
         estop his opponent from asserting a contrary position 
         must show that: (1) his opponent had asserted an 
         inconsistent position under oath in a prior judicial 
         proceeding; (2) the prior statement was accepted by a 
         judicial tribunal; (3) he was a litigant to the first 
         judicial proceeding; and (4) he would be prejudiced 
         unless the opponent is estopped. 
 
Appellant's Br. at 22 (relying on, inter alia, Scarano).  We 
disagree.  The Scarano court was careful to warn that in applying 
judicial estoppel, "`each case must be decided upon its own 
particular facts and circumstances.'"  Scarano, 203 F.2d at 513 
(quoting Galt v. Phoenix Indemnity Co., 120 F.2d 723, 726 
(App.D.C. 1941)).  Moreover, in Ryan Operations this court 
recently emphasized that the application of judicial estoppel is 
not limited in the formulaic manner urged by Appellant:   
              There are many instances in which the assertion of 
         inconsistent positions can work to the advantage of a 
         party but where there is no identity or relationship 
         between those against whom the claim (or defense) is 
         asserted.  Where the contentions are mutually 
         exclusive, it is irrelevant that they are asserted 
         against diverse parties for the purposes of determining 
         judicial estoppel.  The integrity of the court is 
         affronted by the inconsistency notwithstanding the lack 
         of identity of those against whom it is asserted. 
 
Ryan Operations, 81 F.3d at 360.  Thus the doctrine of this court 
on judicial estoppel remains rooted in the twin concepts that 
have characterized our jurisprudence from our early 
pronouncements in Scarano in 1953 to the current refinements 
expressed this year in Ryan Operations: judicial estoppel is an 
equitable doctrine, invoked by a court in its discretion (1) to 
preserve the integrity of the judicial system by preventing 
parties from playing fast and loose with the courts in assuming 
inconsistent positions, and (2) with a recognition that each case 
must be decided upon its own particular facts and circumstances.  
         In light of this clearly established rationale, the 
district court was well within its discretion to hold that 
McNemar "is estopped from arguing now that he is `qualified' 
under the ADA and NJLAD."  Dist. Ct. Op. at 8-9.  Indeed, the 
jurisprudence of this court on judicial estoppel would seem to 
speak directly to McNemar's situation: "[t]o permit a party to 
assume a position inconsistent with a position it had 
successfully relied upon in a past proceeding `would flagrantly 
exemplify . . . playing "fast and loose with the courts" which 
has been emphasized as an evil the courts should not tolerate.'"  
Delgrosso, 903 F.2d at 241 (quoting Scarano, 203 F.2d at 513). 
          
         We are satisfied that the district court's application 
of judicial estoppel qualifies under the two-part threshold 
inquiry articulated in Ryan Operations: (1) Is the party's 
present position inconsistent with a position formerly asserted? 
(2) If so, did the party assert either or both of the 
inconsistent positions in bad faith -- i.e., "with intent to play 
fast and loose" with the court?  Ryan Operations, 81 F.3d at 361.  
         Clearly McNemar has asserted inconsistent positions 
regarding his ability to work.  Before the Social Security 
Administration he and his physicians have certified under penalty 
of perjury that he was totally and permanently disabled.  He made 
similar representations when he applied for New Jersey state 
disability benefits.  And when applying for an exemption from 
making payments on his student loans, he represented to the state 
of Pennsylvania that he was unable to work and earn money.  Thus, 
McNemar has represented to one federal agency and to the agencies 
of two different states that he was totally disabled and unable 
to work -- while now, in claiming relief under the American 
Disabilities Act, he states that he is "a qualified person with a 
disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can 
perform the essential functions of a job" as contemplated by 42 
U.S.C.  12111(8), 12112(a).   
         Moreover, well reasoned decisions have judicially 
estopped plaintiffs in situations similar to this one from 
"speak[ing] out of both sides of [their] mouth with equal vigor 
and credibility before [the] court."  Riegel v. Kaiser Foundation 
Health Plan of N.C., 859 F. Supp. 963, 970 (E.D.N.C. 1994).  See, 
e.g., August v. Offices Unlimited, Inc., 981 F.2d 576, 582-84 
(1st Cir. 1992); Garcia-Paz v. Swift Textiles, 873 F. Supp. 547, 
554 (D. Kan. 1995); Kennedy v. Applause, Inc., 1994 WL 740765 at 
*3-*4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 1994).  McNemar's statements on his 
disability benefits application are "unconditional assertions as 
to his disability"; he should not now be permitted to "qualify 
those statements where the application itself is unequivocal."  
Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc. 911 F. Supp. 1351, 1361 (D.Kan. 
1995) (citing Scarano, 203 F.2d at 513). 
   
                                V. 
         McNemar alleges that in terminating his employment, 
Disney violated the Americans With Disabilities Act and the New 
Jersey Law Against Discrimination.  Because the New Jersey 
statute relies on the same analytical framework as does the 
federal act, the district court addressed these claims together.  
Dist. Ct. Op. at 6-7 (citing Shaner v. Horizon Bancorp., 561 A.2d 
1130, 1132 (N.J. 1989)).  To qualify for protection against 
discrimination under Title I of the ADA, a plaintiff must prove 
that he or she is a "qualified person with a disability who, with 
or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential 
functions of the job."  42 U.S.C.  12111(8), 12112(a).  
Accordingly, a person unable to work is not intended to be, and 
is not, covered by the ADA.  See 42 U.S.C.  423(d); see also  
H.R. Rep. No. 101-485 (II), 101st Cong. 2d. Sess. 71 (1990), 
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 353; H.R. Rep. No. 101-485 (III), 
101st Cong. 2d. Sess. 35-36 (1990), reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 458.  The New Jersey statute contains a similar 
requirement, prohibiting discrimination against handicapped 
persons "unless the nature and extent of the handicap reasonably 
precludes the performance of the particular employment."  
N.J.S.A.  10:5-4.1.  Thus to be covered by these statutes, 
McNemar had to prove that at all material times he was able to 
perform the essential functions of his job, with or without 
accommodation.  See McDonald v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 62 
F.3d 92, 96 (3d Cir. 1995).   
          In arriving at its decision, the district court 
observed that "most federal courts agree that an employee who 
represents on a benefits application that he is disabled is 
judicially estopped from arguing that he is qualified to perform 
the duties of the position involved."  Dist. Ct. Op. at 9; see, 
e.g., August v. Offices Unlimited, Inc., 981 F.2d 576, 582-84 
(1st Cir. 1992) (plaintiff who certified on form for disability 
benefits that he was "totally disabled" was precluded as a matter 
of law from arguing that he was a "qualified handicapped person" 
under Massachusetts law); Garcia-Paz v. Swift Textiles, 873 F. 
Supp. 547, 554 (D. Kan. 1995) (plaintiff with multiple sclerosis 
who certified on long-term disability benefits application that 
she was "unable to perform material duties of work" was estopped 
from arguing that she was qualified individual under ADA); 
Kennedy v. Applause, Inc., 1994 WL 740765 at *3-*4 (C.D. Cal. 
Dec. 6, 1994) (plaintiff with chronic fatigue syndrome who 
represented for purposes of obtaining disability benefits that 
she was completely disabled was estopped from arguing that she 
was qualified under ADA); Riegel, 859 F. Supp. at 967-70 
(plaintiff with shoulder injury who claimed for purposes of 
receiving disability insurance payments that she was prematurely 
disabled was estopped from arguing that she was qualified under 
ADA).     
         Thus even though this court has not previously applied 
judicial estoppel to facts similar to those before us here, other 
federal courts have addressed analogous factual situations, and 
many have judicially estopped the plaintiffs in those situations 
from "speak[ing] out of both sides of [their] mouth with equal 
vigor and credibility before [the] court."  Riegel, 859 F. Supp. 
at 970.  That precedential basis, and this court's teachings on 
judicial estoppel, clearly support the discretion of the district 
court to estop a party from asserting contradictory positions.   
         In adjudicating cases brought under the ADA and NJLAD, 
courts apply the burden-shifting framework applicable to cases 
brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  See 42 
U.S.C.  12117; Zambelli v. Historic Landmarks, Inc., 1995 WL 
116669 at *3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 20, 1995); Shaner, 561 A.2d at 1132.  
This framework has three steps:  (1) the plaintiff bears the 
burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination; (2) 
the burden then shifts to the defendant, who must offer a 
legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the action; and (3) if 
the defendant satisfies this burden, the plaintiff must then come 
forth with evidence indicating that the defendant's proffered 
reason is merely a pretext.  See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs 
v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. 
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 
         The district court determined that McNemar failed to 
establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the criteria 
articulated above because he admitted that he was not qualified 
to perform his job as Assistant Manager at Disney, and that he is 
thus judicially estopped from arguing that he is now "qualified" 
under the ADA and the NJLAD.  Dist. Ct. Op. at 8-9.  Under the 
facts of this case, we will not disturb that determination.        
 
                               VI. 
         McNemar and the amici challenge the district court's 
application of the doctrine of judicial estoppel here, arguing at 
great length that the court unjustifiably has stretched the 
doctrine to address a problem that properly should be decided by 
looking to the legislative purposes of anti-discrimination that 
underlie the ADA.  This is essentially the position of the court 
in Smith v. Dovenmuehle Morg., Inc., 859 F. Supp. 1138, 1141-43  
(N.D. Ill. 1994), a case which the district court below studied 
and rejected.  In Smith, a plaintiff with AIDS received 
disability benefits from the Social Security Administration on 
the representation that he was disabled, then sued his former 
employer under the ADA.  In holding that the plaintiff was not 
judicially estopped from arguing that he was qualified under the 
ADA, the court reasoned that to hold otherwise would put the 
plaintiff "in the untenable position of choosing between his 
right to seek disability benefits and his right to seek redress 
for an alleged violation of the ADA."  Id. at 1142.  The Smith 
court reasoned also that judicial estoppel would frustrate the 
ADA's purpose of combatting discrimination against disabled 
persons.  Id. 
         In explaining its disagreement with the Smith court, 
the district court below addressed much of the challenge 
presented by the amici on the judicial estoppel issue.  First, 
after recognizing the apparent unfairness of forcing individuals 
to choose between seeking disability benefits and suing under the 
ADA, the district court concluded that, nevertheless, "there is 
no indication that either the United States Congress or the New 
Jersey legislature intended to provide disability benefits to 
persons capable of obtaining gainful employment, and it is the 
province of the legislature rather than this Court to authorize 
such a double recovery."  Dist. Ct. Op. at 11.  Second, the 
district court reasoned that because a disabled person who 
believes he or she has been the victim of discrimination "retains 
the option of filing suit pursuant to the ADA, this Court fails 
to understand how the ADA's goals would be thwarted by adopting 
the principle of judicial estoppel in this case."  Id. at 11-12.  
         The Employment Law Center, one of the amici curiae, 
argues that because "[t]he Social Security disability system and 
the [ADA]'s determination of disability diverge significantly in 
their respective legal standards and statutory intent," 
application of judicial estoppel "between them is thus 
inappropriate."  Amicus Br. of Employment Law Center, et. al., at 
4.  Similarly, McNemar argues that, because AIDS is listed as a 
"presumptive disability" on the Social Security application 
forms, his representations that he is "totally and permanently 
disabled" do not render him unqualified to perform the job of 
Assistant Manager at Disney under the ADA and NJLAD.  We 
disagree.   
         The fact that AIDS is listed as a "presumptive 
disability" on the benefit application forms is irrelevant to the 
case at hand, because the "presumptive disability" status serves 
only to eliminate the requirement that individuals afflicted with 
AIDS offer evidence that they are unable to perform their 
previous jobs.  Whatever the Social Security Administration's 
criteria for eligibility for disability benefits, the fact 
remains that McNemar told the U.S. Government and the states of 
New Jersey and Pennsylvania under penalty of perjury that he was 
physically unable to work, and the district court had the 
discretion to judicially estop him from taking a contradictory 
position in this proceeding.   
         Moreover, we are troubled by this argument from 
Appellant and two amici, the Employment Law Center and the EEOC, 
for it carries the implication that a person afflicted with HIV 
somehow should be permitted to misrepresent important 
information.  The fact that the choice between obtaining federal 
or state disability benefits and suing under the ADA is difficult 
does not entitle one to make false representations with impunity.  
Nothing in the reasoned jurisprudence of judicial estoppel goes 
this far.  Nothing grants a person the authority to flout the 
exalted status that the law accords statements made under oath or 
penalty of perjury.  Nothing permits one to undermine the 
integrity of the judicial system "by playing fast and loose with 
the courts by asserting inconsistent positions."  Ryan 
Operations, 81 F.3d at 358.  Nothing vests such immunity. 
 
                               VII. 
         The EEOC argues also that McNemar's sworn  
declaration of total disability is "after-acquired evidence" that 
has no bearing on the prima facie issue of McNemar's status as a 
qualified individual with a disability.  Yet the threshold 
question in this case, fully examined by the district court, is 
precisely whether McNemar is covered by the ADA for purposes of 
his prima facie case.  
         Nevertheless, the EEOC wants to mix apples -- a 
plaintiff's prima facie case -- with oranges -- a defendant's 
non-discriminatory-reason.  It seeks to analogize this case to 
the teachings of McKennon v. Nashville Banner Pub. Co., ___ U.S. 
___, 115 S. Ct. 879 (1995), which address the doctrine of "after- 
acquired evidence" and establish it as an affirmative defense 
that becomes meaningful once the plaintiff has established a 
prima facie case of discrimination.  At that point, the employer 
is required to articulate its non-discriminatory reason and then 
may assert its additional defenses, such as after-acquired 
evidence, which may limit damages.  See St. Mary's Honor Center 
v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 523-24 (1993).   
         We emphasize again that the relevant question in this 
case is whether McNemar established a prima facie case of 
discrimination, and because he has not, Disney has no obligation 
even to articulate a legitimate business reason for its decision.  
See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 507; Sempier v. Johnson & Higgins, 45 F.3d 
724, 730-32 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2611 (1995).  
Seen in this light, the EEOC's assertion that "[a] plaintiff's 
claim cannot be defeated by an issue of qualifications that has 
nothing to do with the employer's motivation for the adverse 
action" becomes irrelevant, again because that assertion has to 
do with Disney's putative pretext for firing McNemar, which is 
not a proper concern for the court unless McNemar first has 
established a prima facie case that he was qualified for the job.  
This he failed to do. 
 
                              VIII. 
         We turn now to Appellant's other contentions. 
 
                                A. 
         McNemar alleges that Disney violated  510 of ERISA, 29 
U.S.C.  1140, because one of the determining factors in Disney's 
decision to discharge McNemar was to prevent the vesting of his 
pension rights with Disney eleven months later.  To establish a 
prima facie case under ERISA, McNemar was required to show: (1) 
that he belongs to the protected class; (2) that he was qualified 
for the position involved; and (3) that he was discharged or 
denied employment under circumstances that provide some basis for 
believing that the prohibited intent (to interfere with the 
employee's attainment of pension eligibility) was present.  See 
Turner v. Schering-Plough Corp., 901 F.2d 335, 347 (3d Cir. 1990) 
(citing Dister v. Continental Group, Inc., 859 F.2d 1108, 1115 
(2d Cir. 1988)).   
         For the reasons presented above, McNemar cannot 
establish the second required element for making a prima faciecase under 
ERISA -- that he is qualified for the position 
involved.  Because McNemar has not, as a matter of law, 
established a prima facie case of a  510 violation, the district 
court properly entered judgment in favor of Disney on its motion 
for summary judgment regarding McNemar's ERISA claim. 
 
                                B. 
         New Jersey has recognized that the tort of invasion of 
privacy is "not one tort, but . . . comprises four distinct kinds 
of invasion of four different interests of the plaintiff, which 
are tied together by the common name . . . ."  Rumbauskas v. 
Cantor, 649 A.2d 853, 856 (N.J. 1994) (quoting Canessa v. J.I. 
Kislak, Inc., 235 A.2d 62, [66] (N.J. Super. Law Div. 1967)).  
McNemar contends that Disney is liable for two of these: (1) 
intrusion upon his seclusion, and (2) public disclosure of 
private information.  We disagree. 
 
                                1. 
         New Jersey has adopted  652B of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, which states: 
         One who intentionally intrudes, physically or 
         otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or 
         his private affairs or concerns, is subject to 
         liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if 
         the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable 
         person. 
 
Figured v. Paralegal Technical Services, Inc., 555 A.2d 663, 666 
(N.J. Super. App. Div. 1989) (quoting 3 Restatement (Second) of 
Torts  652B (1977)).  Although the intrusion need not be by 
physical intrusion, the examples set forth in the Restatement all 
contain elements of involuntariness.  See Rumbauskas, 649 A.2d at 
857.   
         McNemar argues that Disney is liable for intrusion upon 
his seclusion because Joelyn Ale asked him whether he was HIV- 
positive.  However, Ale's inquiry does not appear to have imposed 
an aspect of involuntariness on McNemar; indeed, McNemar has 
admitted that Ale's intent in the conversation about his 
condition was to be supportive, not confrontational.  JA 30.  
McNemar certainly was not compelled to, and in fact did not, tell 
Ale about his condition.  In light of this evidence, Ale's 
inquiry hardly was coercive, let alone "highly offensive to a 
reasonable person," and thus was not an invasion of privacy under 
New Jersey law.      
 
 
                                 2. 
         On the second basis of invasion of privacy -- public 
disclosure of private information -- McNemar alleges that Disney 
invaded his privacy by publicly disclosing private facts when, in 
late November 1993, an assistant store manager told Julia Walsh, 
a friend of McNemar's, that he had resigned because he had AIDS.  
To state a claim for public disclosure of private facts, a 
plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that the defendant has given 
publicity to matters that actually were private, (2) that 
dissemination of such facts would be offensive to a reasonable 
person, and (3) that there is no legitimate interest of the 
public in being apprised of the facts publicized.  Bisbee v. John 
C. Conover Agency, Inc., 452 A.2d 689, 691-92 (N.J. App. Div. 
1982) (adopting 3 Restatement (Second) of Torts  652D).   
         The Restatement defines "publicity" as follows: 
         "Publicity" . . . means that the matter is made public, 
         by communicating it to the public at large, or to so 
         many persons that the matter must be regarded as 
         substantially certain to become one of public knowledge 
         . . . .  Thus it is not an invasion of the right to 
         privacy . . . to communicate a fact concerning the 
         plaintiff's private life to a single person or even to 
         a small group of persons. 
 
Restatement (Second) of Torts 652D, Comment (a).  The evidence 
of McNemar's publicity consists primarily of allegations of (1) a 
disclosure by a store manager to McNemar's aunt and uncle that he 
"had resigned because it was too much" on his health, and (2) a 
disclosure by an unidentified store employee to a friend of 
McNemar's who already knew that he was HIV-positive.  JA 284, 
724-5.  Clearly, as a matter of law, these allegations are not 
sufficient to state a prima facie case of invasion of privacy for 
publicity given to private facts.  Accordingly, the district 
court properly granted Disney's motion for summary judgment on 
this element of McNemar's claim. 
 
                                C. 
         New Jersey law requires that a plaintiff who claims 
intentional infliction of emotional distress meet four 
requirements: (1) that the defendant acted recklessly or 
intentionally; (2) that the conduct was extreme and outrageous; 
(3) that the defendant's actions were the proximate cause of the 
plaintiff's distress; and (4) that the plaintiff actually 
suffered severe emotional distress.  Figured, 555 A.2d at 665 
(quoting Buckley v. Trenton Savings Fund Soc., 544 A.2d 857, 
[863] (N.J. 1988) and Restatement (Second) of Torts  46 (1965)).  
         McNemar's contention is unpersuasive because Disney's 
conduct was not extreme and outrageous, which under New Jersey 
law means conduct "so outrageous in character, and so extreme in 
degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be 
regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized 
community."  Figured, 555 A.2d at 665.  The record does not offer 
any evidence to suggest that Disney's discharge of McNemar was 
extreme and outrageous.  McNemar admits that his discharge was 
handled in a discreet manner, and that the reasons for his 
discharge were not disclosed to others.  JA 39-40.  Moreover, 
there is no evidence that Disney harassed McNemar in any way; and 
termination of employment does not, without evidence of 
harassment, support a claim of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress.  See Heckroth v. Amer. Tel. & Tel., 1991 WL 
157302 at *5 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 9, 1991) (citing Borecki v. Eastern 
Int'l Mat. Corp., 694 F. Supp. 47, 61 (D.N.J. 1988)).  McNemar 
has not alleged harassment by Disney.  Accordingly, the district 
court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Disney on 
McNemar's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. 
                      * * * * * * * * * * * 
         We have considered all arguments presented by the 
parties and conclude that no further discussion is necessary. 
         The judgment of the district court will be affirmed. 
          
 
 
 
